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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the wave of investment in agriculture in 
16th and 17th century France, a movement with parallels throughout 
western Europe. After dismissing the explanations advanced by most 
historians, I argue that the investment in agriculture resulted from 
royal tax policy. I then consider the predilection investors showed 
for sharecropping and suggest that this predilection can be explained 
in light of modern economic theories of share contracts. 
INVESTLENT IN AGRICULTURE IN EARLY MODERN FRANCE 
Philip T. Hoffman 
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From the mid-sixteenth century to the early 1700's, the money 
of wealthy Frenchman flowed into land. Merchants, lawyers, royal 
officials, and nobles lent money to unpoverished peasants, who 
frequently defaulted on their loans and then were forced to sell their 
property. The creditors or other privileged investors thus gained 
title to the peasants' vineyards or fields, and they subsequently 
leased these holdings to tenants or sharecroppers, who often turned 
out to be the very peasants who had originally owned the land. Thus 
in 1576 a beleaguered laboureur named Jehan Crespeau, in debt to his 
seigneur, sold his farm, land and buildings to the lord. The same day 
the lord leased the property back to Crespeau for a rent in kind.I 
The records of this great wave of investment in land fill page 
after page of notarial registers, and the process was common enough to 
have attracted the attention of contemporaries. In Lyon, for example, 
the local historian Guillaume Pa radin described in 1573 how the city's 
wealthy merchants and bankers had been buying land from destitute 
peasants at bargain prices: 
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The poor laboureurs, lacking enough to eat, were constrained to 
put their lands up for sale at rock bottom prices to rich people, 
who thereby acquired good lands and vineyards for a morsel of 
bread. In this way, many have built beautiful farms and vi111s, 
constructing their country houses upon the misery of paupers. 
Nor is this the only example of contemporary comment. 3 
Modern historians have not neglected the phenomenon either. 
From the classic studies by Gaston Roupnel in the 1920's and Louis 
Merle in the 1950's to the more recent works of the social historians 
Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie and Jean Jacquart, scholars have noted the 
upsurge of investment in land in Burgundy in the east, in the Gatine 
Poitevine in the west, in Languedoc in the south, and in the 
hinterland of Paris in the north. In fact, the pattern of investment 
in land seems to have occurred throughout France, and it has parallels 
elsewhere in Mediterranean Europe, most notably in northern Italy. 4 
Almost without exception, historians have depicted this flight 
of money into land in early modern France in somber tones. It has 
indeed become a commonplace of French social history to describe how 
debt and the loss of their lands destroyed the independence and 
prosperity of French peasants. At the same time, historians have 
condemned the merchants, officers and nobles who purchased the peasant 
land for their supposed indifference to profits and their failure to 
provide their farms with capital. Presumably, these purchasers and 
investors were content to live off the misery of their tenants. 
Perhaps the only dissenting voice to this argument comes from Robert 
Brenner, who argues that the sales of land in the early modern period 
did nothing to destroy the independent French peasantry. But even 
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Brenner maintains that the investors who bought land did not in any 
way encourage efficiency and ''progress'' in the agricultural sector.5 
It is not my intention to rewrite the history of investment in 
agriculture in early modern France, for as yet I have precious little 
evidence to add to tbe balance. What I shall do is to raise several 
questions that historians, despite all the work in the field, have 
never answered satisfactorily. I have as yet no firm responses to 
these questions, but I will advance a number of rather tentative 
hypotheses, hypotheses that will help guide the research I plan to 
undertake in this area. 
The first question I want to deal with is chronological: why 
was it during the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in 
particular that urban money flowed into land? Despite all that has 
been written on the subject, historians have not devised a 
satisfactory answer to this question. Often scholars cite the 
peasants' ''misery'', at that time, but real though it may have been, 
misery is merely a symptom, not a cause. We need to know precisely 
what it was that reduced the peasants to grinding poverty and forced 
them to sell their land in the late sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. Why did they not sell before 1550 or after 1700? 
Similarly, it is not enough to invoke the security and status that 
property ownership conferred in order to explain why French elites 
increased their purchases of land. Owning property undoubtedly 
fulfilled a variety of non-economic desires, but there is no reason to 
believe that these became more pronounced after 1550 and then less 
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iL1portant after 1700. 
Another factor that is often cited - mauvaise conjoncture or 
unfavorable economic conditions -- seems equally vacuous as an 
explanation. If mauvaise conjoncture means simply reduced profits 
from farming, why did privileged investors continue to buy farms? And 
even if we ignore this question, it is not at all clear that returns 
from agriculture did fall. To be sure, some historians have used a 
drop in tithe returns to argue that agricultural profits declined, but 
in several areas tithe returns did not slump until well after the 
sales of land had begun, and in any case, the tithe is not an index of 
profits, but rather of gross revenues.6 Agricultural lease rates, 
which provide a better index of the expected prof its to be derived 
from farming, actually rose in the last half of the sixteenth century 
and in the early seventeenth century, at a time when enonnous 
quantities of land were changing hands.7 
lf, on the other hand, mauvaise conjoncture means simply a 
succession of crop failures, then we must somehow demonstrate that the 
fluctuations of agricultural revenues were greater between 1550 and 
1700 than in other years. Although it would be possible to do this 
(one could imagine a world in which a higher variation in agricultural 
revenues favored large investors who could spread risks, and one could 
test for a higher variance of revenues using tithe or lease records), 
no one has yet formulated the necessary model. And in any case, it 
seems highly unlikely that revenues would vary more than normally for 
one hundred and fifty years. 
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A related explanation for the flow of money into land involves 
population growth and diminishing returns in agriculture. Emmanuel Le 
Roy Ladurie and others have argued that increases in population 
fragmented peasant holdings and reduced many farms to the point that 
they were no longer profitable.8 Left with a pitiful existence on a 
tiny scrap of land, many a peasant was forced to sell. The problem 
with this argument, though, is that in most areas of France population 
growth ceased in the early seventeenth century. With a stagnant or 
declining population, one would presume that the size of farms would 
stabilize and that peasants would no longer have any reason to sell. 
But as we know the sales of land continued for nearly one hundred 
years.9 
Moreover, this whole line of reasoning neglects a number of 
strategies which peasants could and did adopt in times of population 
growth. In the countryside around Lyon, for example, peasants sought 
work in the city when the population was rising. They also married 
later, which limited the size of their families and brought 
fragmentation to a halt. Furthermore, they could -- and did � shift 
to labor-intensive cultivation, such as viticulture, and thus 
circumvent some of the problems of diminishing returns. Since the 
labor intensive crops seem to have peru1itted a prof it even on small 
plots of land, it is not at all clear that population growth and 
estate fragmentation (even when they occurred) would have forced the 
peasants to sell. IO Finally, even if population growth sheds light on 
some of the land sales, it does not explain why nobles, urban 
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merchants and other privileged investors predominated among the 
buyers. There were, after all, peasants who were in a position to 
purchase plots of land to round off their holdings: the village 
syndics, for instance, who collected the local taxes. Yet it seems to 
be outsiders -- the nobles, merchants and officers -- who made the 
h l  . . . f "  11 overw e ming maJority o investments. 
Surprisingly, French historians have overlooked what would 
seem to be an obvious explanation for investment in agriculture in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: royal tax policy. To be sure, 
they pay lip service to taxes when they discuss the misery of the 
peasantry, but they ignore the effect that taxes had on iovestment.12 
The major taxes in France -- and here I simplify tremendously were 
the taille, a land tax, and aides, indirect taxes on a number of items 
including many agricultural commodities. All of these taxes fell 
disproportionately upon the peasant ry. Nobles and most royal officers 
were exempt from the taille, and in much of the kingdom (in areas of 
taille personelle) this exemption extended to any land they held in 
the countryside.13 Similarly, urban merchants (and especially those 
who enjoyed some political influence) paid a reduced taille on 
property outside their city. Furthermore, the nobles, officers and 
urban merchants were frequently exempt from the indirect taxes levied 
on crops from farmlands they owned. In sixteenth-century Lyon, for 
example, if a merchant purchased a vineyard from a peasant, the 
vineyard would in effect be withdrawn from the tax rolls of the 
peasant' s village. In theory, the merchant would pay a tax on this 
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property as a part of Lyon's own levy on real property, but his 
assessment would be far less than the portion of the taille the 
peasant had originally paid. In addition, the merchant could bring 
wine from his own vineyard into the city without paying aides. 
Although the wine he imported was ostensibly for his personal use, he 
could no doubt sell it on the market. The peasant who previously 
owned the vineyard would of course have had to pay the aides. 14 
The net effect of the exemptions and the disproportionate tax 
burden on the peasantry was to drive a number of peasants out of 
business. Peasants fell into debt to pay taxes that rose 
precipitously in the last half of the sixteenth century and stayed 
high until the early eighteenth century. They then sold out to 
privileged investors who rented or sharecropped the land. These 
privileged landholders were willing to purchase the land (and willing 
to pay more for it than any non-privileged farmer) because it gave 
them an opportunity to exploit their tax exemptions.15 Worse, each 
sale to a noble or privileged merchant only aggravated the 
difficulties of the remaining peasants by removing land from the tax 
rolls. Since those who remained had to pay the village's assessment, 
their own taxes rose accordingly. The whole process came to a halt 
only when higher land prices and the costs of administering distant 
estates outweighed the profits from a tax execption. Eventually, the 
royal government also took steps to limit tax exeL1ptions in order to 
protect its tax revenues. Although to a certain extent this policy 
curbed the flow of money into land, the royal edicts and court 
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decisions were never enforced with any vigor.16 
The hypothesis that rising taxes and inequitable exemptions 
were at least partially responsible for the flow of money into land 
certainly appears to explain the chronology of the investments. Taxes 
rose considerably in the middle of the sixteenth century, at just the 
time that the money began to flow into land, and there was no relief 
until the end of Louis XIV's reign, in the early eighteenth century, 
at about the time that investment in land tapered off. To demonstrate 
this rigorously, though, will require more precise tests. One 
possibility would be to collect figures on investment and land sales 
in a given region for a number of years and regress them against local 
tax levies. Another would be to take a cross section of different 
regions at a given time and see whether differences in taxes and tax 
laws could explain varying levels of investment.17 
If taxes seem a likely explanation for the wave of investment 
in agriculture in early modern France, can we also explain the 
predilection investors showed for sharecropping? And what were the 
consequences of the spread of sharecropping contracts? Sharecropping 
was not unknown in the Middle Ages, but not until the sixteenth 
century and the great wave of investment in land did it spread 
throughout much of France. 1 8 So far, historians have not devised a 
. . 1 . f . 1 . 19 convincing exp anation or its popu arity. Here, perhaps, some 
recent investigations by economic theorists can cast some light upon 
the phenomenon. In an attempt to explain the prevalence of 
sharecropping today, economic theorists have devised a number of 
arguments, of which one in particular seems relevant to early modern 
France.2 0
This explanation involves the fact that agriculture is risky. 
If a landlord hires labor to work his land, he assumes all the risks 
of blights, crop failures, and bad weather. If he rents his property 
for a fixed fee, it is the tenant who bears the burden of the risk. 
The sharecropping contract, by contrast, allows the landlord and the 
person who actually fanis the land to share the risks, which would 
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seem to have advantages for both of them if they are risk-averse. The 
opportunity to share the risk will in fact benefit both landlord and 
sharecropper, but only under certain conditions. First, the landlord 
has to be able to enforce contracts that specify the work a 
sharecropper is to perform: how much plowing, how much hoeing, etc. 
If contracts cannot be enforced, sharecroppers have a great incentive 
to undersupply labor, which would make landlords shy away from 
sharecropping. Second, at least one of two additional conditions has 
to be met: 
1) There must be risks in the market for labor, land, or one of the 
other factors of production. These risks could involve, for 
exanple, having to pay higher and unpredictable wages for 
temporary laborers at harvest time. 
2 )  There must be economies of scale in agriculture. The economies of 
scale could derive from the lack of a rental market for work 
animals, wagons or other expensive pieces of farm equipment. 
Without a rental market for draft animals, for exaMple, a farmer 
would have to buy a team of oxen, whether his farm were large or 
small. With a large farm, he could spread the costs of the oxen 
over more acres, and his average costs would be lower. The 
economies of scale might also stem from the fixed costs of 
enforcing the clauses in a labor, sharecropping or rental 
contract, or they could reflect untraded factors of production, 
such as a farmer's skill. 
If either of these two conditions obtain and landlords can enforce 
contracts, then sharecropping will present both landlord and the 
potential sharecropper with advantages as a means of splitting 
risks.2 1
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One might of course doubt that such theories would be relevant 
to the Old Regime. At least one knowledgeable contemporary, however, 
perceived in sharecropping some of the same advantages that modern 
economists have claimed for it. This was Olivier de Serres, who in 
16 00 published the classic early modern French treatise on 
agriculture, Le theatre de l'agriculture.2 2  I n  this work, the fruit 
of his own experience as a landlord and farmer, de Serres considered 
the various drawbacks and advantages of farming land with tenants, 
sharecroppers or hired labor. He noted that whereas a renter ''takes 
on the responsibility at his own loss or profit, " a sharecropper 
"does not risk everything in advance as he only contracts to 
cultivate the land for a share." Given the difficulties of finding 
tenants who could or would take on these risks, de Serres recommended 
sharecropping to all but the biggest landlords. He also felt that 
sharecropping was superior to hired labor for absentee landlords 
because the costs of supervising laborers were too high.2 3
Olivier de Serres does not recapitulate the theory of 
sharecropping in its entirety, but his statement that sharecroppers 
bear less risk than renters suggests that he recogn ized the advantages 
of a share system. His remarks about the supervision of labor also 
recall certain features of the theory. It is thus not completely 
anachronistic to apply the theory to early modern France. 
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We can therefore ask whether the conditions that explain 
sharecropping theoretically were actually met in the French 
countryside. If we consider first the enforceability of labor 
contracts, it is clear that landlords certainly tried to specify how 
much labor their sharecroppers were to contribute. In addition to 
stipulating traditional seasonal tasks of the agricultural year, 
sharecropping contracts commonly required the sharecroppers to perform 
a certain amount of carting. Sharecroppers also had to maintain or 
improve the property. They might have to carry a specified quantity 
of the soil that had washed to the bottom of the vineyard back to the 
top of the hillside, or they might have to build so many feet of 
hedges or enclosures each year. 2 4  Proving that landlords always 
managed to enforce these clauses would require further research, but 
at first glance it would not seem difficult for a landlord or his 
agent to verify that the work had been performed. If the sharecropper 
did not plow, for exaruple, there would be no crop, and a landlord 
could actually see whether hedges or enclosures had been built. 
Moreover, investors who bought land tended to purchase property close 
to their own residence, so that it could easily be inspected, and 
sometimes they even summered in the midst of their agricultural 
possessions. Finally, the sharecropping contracts usually contained a 
variety of penalties directed against tenants who did not perform 
their duties. 25 
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If the landlords were able to enforce the labor clauses in 
contracts, what about the two other conditions that figure in the 
theory? To begin with, at least one of the factor markets, the market 
for labor, does seem to have been risky. In the Gitine poitevine 
described by Louis Merle, for example, faru1ers often had to hire a 
large number of workers at harvest time, but they had no idea in 
advance of how many hands they would need. The higher wages they paid 
for these short teru1 laborers reflected the risks involved. 2 6
There is also reason to believe that economies of scale 
�xisted in agriculture. First of all, important pieces of farm 
equipment could not be rented, at least in certain regions. To return 
to the Gitine again, farmers apparently could rent cattle from 
livestock raisers who maintained ''banks'' of animals. It was no 
doubt also likely that they could hire a plowing team for a day. But 
1espite these well developed rental markets, farmers could not lease 
one of the most important and most expensive pieces of farm machinery: 
Jagons, which were by far the costliest item in fann inventories and 
Jhich were absolutely essential for many of the tasks stipulated in 
sharecropping contracts. Unable to rent or to build the wagons he 
needed, a farrner would have to spend one or two hundred livres, an 
ar.1ount equal to four or five times the value of all his other farrn 
etiuipment. 27 This high cost would be an obvious source of economies 
;:,f scale. 
Similarly, the expense of supervising hired laborers, tenant 
(armers or shari:croppers (including the costs of enforcini; contracts 
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for absentee landlords) would inevitably produce additional economies 
of scale. Olivier de Serres, for one, discussed these expenses in 
great detail. In his opinion, the costs of supervison made hired 
labor prohibitively expensive, save for individuals who resided on 
their own farms. Renters, according to de Serres, were also costly, 
for a landlord had to find a reliable tenant and then make sure that 
he did not neglect the farm buildings. In de Serres' opinion, the 
best solution for absentee landlords (save for the biggest, who could 
attract large scale, solvent tenants) was sharecropping. In effect, 
de Serre recognized the advantages of sharecropping in the face of 
economies of scale.2 8  The landlords who let their land out for shares 
were evidentially aware of these economies of scale, for they almost 
inevitably tried to consolidate and enlarge their farms. 
Since the various conditions of the theory seem to hold, we 
have a ready explanation for the reason why a nlllllber of landlords 
(though not all) resorted to sharecropping instead of rental contracts 
2 9  o r  wage labor. What then were the consequences of the spread of 
share farming and the wave of investment in agriculture1 
Traditionally, sharecropping and the privileged landlords have been 
held responsible for the chronic ills of French agriculture. 
Historians have argued that short term share contracts vith rigid 
clauses eliminated any incentives for investment or technological 
change. And they have blamed the absentee landlords for exploiting 
such an inefficient systera. The economic theory, by contrast, 
suggests that sharecropping was relatively efficient, and the 
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historical evidence tends to confirm this. The contracts often 
extended over a nU111ber of years (five to nine years in the Gatine, for 
example, six years northvest of Lyon), and it therefore seems 
incorrect to say that sharecropping sacrificed long term development 
to short term profit. If the clauses in individual contracts drawn 
from particular regions seem rigid, they nevertheless varied from 
place to place and evolved over time. 3 0  Moreover, as the theory would 
predict, landlords of sharecroppers did engage in investments. They 
generally tried to consolidate their holdings, they built hedges and 
enclosures, and they endowed their property with larger amounts of 
livestock. In Burgundy, they were responsible for the introduction 
and commercialization of high quality wines. 3 1  And if they failed to
adopt all of the techniques that revolutionized farming in England, 
the reason may lie in part with soils that would not accept the 
improvements and factor prices that made them uneconomica 1. 3 2
In saying this, I do not mean to defend the agricultural 
system of Old Regime France, for its inefficiency and inequality are 
indisputable. Elucidating these problems of French agricultural 
history, though, will require more thoughtful explanations than 
historians have devised in the past. In particular, historians will 
have to pay closer attention to the economic consequences of politics 
under the Old Regime. 
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risk neutral landlord, for exar"ple, would resort to hired labor 
ratlier than tenant farmers or sharecroppers. A better 
explanation, though, for the predilections individuals had for 
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various contracts can be found in Hallagan's ''Self Selection." 
Hallagan's landlords, tenants and agricultural workers are 
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